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NO. 47523-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-53288

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark Vincent Welsh pied guilty to felony domestic battery and was sentenced to five
years, with three years fixed. Mr. Welsh appeals, asserting the district court abused its discretion
by imposing an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule 35 Motion.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In November 2018, Mr. Welsh was on felony parole for a felony driving under the
influence ("DUI") conviction. (See PSI, pp.311-312.) One evening, the daughter of his girlfriend
arrived home and initially reported to police that she had "observed [Mr. Welsh] straddling her
mother who was on the couch and he was punching her in the head." (PSI, p.29.) Mr. Welsh was
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located at his mother's home a short distance away where he was arrested for domestic battery.
(PSI, p.29.)

The State filed an Information charging Mr. Welsh with one count of felony domestic
violence or battery, third offense within fifteen years; or, in the alternative, felony domestic
violence or battery. (R., pp.22-23.) The following week, the State filed a motion to proceed on
Information Part II charging Mr. Welsh with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.26-30.)
Mr. Welsh agreed to plead guilty to domestic battery, third offense within fifteen years;
m exchange, the state would dismiss alternate count I and the Information Part II, and
recommend a sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to be served concurrent with the
parole hold. (R., pp.41-48.) 1 The State confirmed that, as part of this offer, the defense was not
allowed to argue for a lesser sentence and that the State was allowed to use the dismissed charges
to "argue in aggravation at sentencing." (05/06/2019 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-7.)
At sentencing, the State made the sentence recommendation required by the plea
agreement of five years, with two years fixed, concurrent with his DUI sentence. (09/30/2019
Tr., p.18, Ls.5-7.) The State also recommended a no-contact order be entered with no exceptions.
(09/30/2019 Tr., p.18, Ls.8-21.) Counsel for Mr. Welsh also recommended the sentence required
by the plea agreement. (09/30/2019 Tr., p.26, Ls.11-18.)
The district court imposed a sentence of "three years fixed followed by two years
indeterminate, concurrent with the parole" because it wanted to acknowledge and "[give] respect
to the parties' plea bargain agreement." (09/30/2019 Tr., p.39, Ls.2-12.) The court also entered a
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This plea deal included Mr. Welsh pleading guilty to certain charges in the other case, with the
State dismissing felony witness-influencing charge in that case. (See 05/06/2019 Tr., p.6, Ls.37.)
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no-contact order that would "stay in place" until it was "convinced that the victim [was no
longer] so lacking in self-protection." (09/30/2019 Tr., p.39, Ls.1-2, 17-21; PSI, pp.705-06.)
Mr. Welsh timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.60-61.) Shortly
afterwards, he filed a pro-se Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his sentence. (R., pp.66-70.) In
that motion, he described how the victim had retracted her initial statements, his brother's
terminal cancer diagnosis and mother's hip injuries, his desire to complete an intensive in-patient
alcohol abuse program, and concerns about the prison conditions. (R., pp.68-69.) Mr. Welsh
asked the court to reduce the fixed portion of his sentence either by half, or to two years "as per
agreed plea agreement with [the] Ada County Prosecutor." (R., p.69.)2 The court denied
Mr. Welsh's Rule 35 motion, stating that "[n]o information has been submitted which warrants
changing the sentence." (R., pp.83-84.)3

ISSUES
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with three years fixed, following Mr. Welsh's plea of guilty to felony domestic
battery?

I.

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Welsh's Rule 35 motion?
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At the same time, Mr. Welsh also filed a motion for a hearing on his Rule 35 motion (R., pp.7173), a motion for appointment of counsel (R., pp.74-77), and a motion to proceed on partial
payment of court fees (R., pp.78-82). Mr. Welsh assumes that all of these motions were
implicitly denied by the court when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
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Because Mr. Welsh timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction, per Idaho Appellate
Rule 17(e)(l)(C), the denial of that motion is deemed included in this appeal.
3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Welsh Following His Plea Of Guilty To Felony Domestic
Battery

A.

Introduction
Mr. Welsh asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed an excessive

sentence after he pled guilty to domestic battery. Specifically, he asserts that because the
sentence imposed was greater than what had been stipulated to as part of the plea agreement, the
district court erred as mitigating evidence in the record should have led the court to impose a
lesser sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
There are "four objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society, (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). However, "the primary consideration is the
good order and protection of society, [and a]ll other factors must be subservient to that end." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations removed).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573 (1979)).
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When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original).

In this case, Mr. Welsh contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to
exercise reason in its ultimate sentencing decision. "[R]easonableness is a fundamental
requirement." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). "'[R]easonableness' implies that a term of
confinement should be tailored to the purposes for which the sentence is imposed." Toohill, 103
Idaho at 568.

C.

Mitigating Evidence In The Record Should Have Led The District Court To Abide By
The Terms Of The Plea Agreement Between Mr. Welsh And The State
Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant. State v.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that when reviewing a sentence, Idaho's appellate

courts will "review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest") (emphasis added). The

record in this case reflects a wealth of mitigating evidence that should have weighed in favor of
the court abiding by the terms of Mr. Welsh's plea agreement, including his alcohol abuse
problem, his willingness to voluntarily rehabilitate from his alcoholism, and his acceptance of
responsibility for his actions. Mr. Welsh asserts that, had the district court given that mitigating
evidence its proper weight, the district court should have been led to abide by the sentence
recommended in the plea agreement. By instead increasing the fixed period of time in his
sentence from that agreement, Mr. Welsh asserts the district court did not exercise reason and
abused its discretion.
5

In addition, a sentencing court must give "proper consideration of the defendant's
[substance abuse] problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). While
being under the influence of drugs or alcohol "is not sufficient in itself to raise a defense to the
crime, it is our conclusion that any arguable impact of such substance abuse is a proper
consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing." State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
n.5 (1981). Courts should also look at "a willingness to seek treatment for an alcohol problem"
as a mitigating factor. State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008).
The record is replete with examples of the problems caused by Mr. Welsh's alcohol
abuse. At sentencing, the court acknowledged his "longstanding and significant" problems including domestic violence - that had resulted from his "heavy alcohol use." (09/30/2019
Tr., p.33, L.6 - p.34, L.16.) Substance abuse evaluations from prior cases indicated that
Mr. Welsh meets the criteria for a diagnosis of "Alcohol Use Disorder, Severe. (PSI, pp.32728.)4 Alcohol has been a problem for decades as Mr. Welsh first began using alcohol around
(PSI, p.319.) His first arrest after turning

happened when he broke into a home

while under the influence. (PSI, p.427.) Since then, alcohol has been a factor in multiple other
convictions, and he was on parole for a DUI conviction at the time of his arrest. (PSI, pp.344-45,
405.) On his own, Mr. Welsh acknowledged his alcohol problem and had applied for, and had
been admitted to an intensive in-patient alcohol treatment program before his arrest in this case.
(R., p.14; see also 09/30/2019 Tr., p.20, Ls.8-21.) However, as Mr. Welsh's counsel described it,

4 A full GAIN evaluation was unable to be conducted for the presentence investigation in this
case as Mr. Welsh had been incarcerated for more than six months. (PSI, p.327.) Instead, a "faceto-face interview and a file review [was conducted] to screen for substance use disorders and
psychiatric symptoms." (PSI, p.327.)
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he "unfortunately spent the day before entering that program drinking alcohol." (09/30/2019
Tr., p.20, Ls.22-23.)
Courts should also consider as mitigating expressions of remorse and whether "the
defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts." See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, "expressed regret for what he had
done, especially for the effect it had upon his family and friends, but also indicated that he was
confident he could be a productive citizen in the future"); see also State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166,
171 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Coffin points to several mitigating circumstances that he contends
rendered his sentence unreasonably long . . . [including] his expression of remorse for his
conduct."); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) (treating as mitigating the
fact that the defendant "acknowledged the wrongfulness of the [drug sale] transaction and he
openly expressed contrition for his acts"), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990)).
At sentencing, Mr. Welsh made a statement to the court expressing his remorse and
acceptance of responsibility for his actions. (see, generally, 09/30/2019 Tr., p.27, L.5 - p.32,
L.19 (Mr. Welsh's full statement).) In that statement, Mr. Welsh clearly and unequivocally told
the court he "fully [took] accountability and responsibility for [his actions] that day."
(09/30/2019 Tr., p.31, Ls.22-24.) He told the court he knew he needed to get "rid of' his alcohol
problem, not just for himself, but for his future marriage. (09/30/2019 Tr., p.32, Ls.7-10.)
Mr. Welsh asserts the court did not properly weigh these life-long problems and other
mitigating factors; if it had, it would not have imposed a sentence greater than what was
recommended in the plea agreement.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Welsh's Rule 35 Motion

A.

Introduction
Mr. Welsh asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his prose Rule

35 motion to reduce his sentence. Specifically, Mr. Welsh asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to exercise reason in light of new mitigating evidence he presented
supporting that motion that should have led to the requested reduction of his sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
"If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule

35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion."

State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (citing State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 318
(2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846 (Ct. App. 1989)). "The criteria for evaluating rulings
on motions to reduce sentences under Rule 35 are the same as those applied in determining
whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22 (Ct. App. 1987).
Accordingly, the district court's ruling will be evaluated for the four factors described in

Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863.
"When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (citing Knighton,
143 Idaho at 320; State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285 (2003)).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Adequately Consider Mitigating Evidence Before Denying
Mr. Welsh's Rule 35 Motion
As previously discussed, district courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in

favor of the defendant. Strand, 13 7 Idaho at 460. This includes when a court is considering a
Rule 35 motion. See State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho 177, 180 (Ct. App. 2016) (discussing district
court's consideration of mitigating evidence when ruling on a Rule 35 motion). A defendant's
progress towards rehabilitation during any period of incarceration is one factor, among others,
that may be mitigating. State v. Barreto, 122 Idaho 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[I]n a Rule 35
hearing, the district court may consider facts presented at the original sentencing as well as any
other information concerning the defendant's rehabilitative progress while in confinement."); see
also, State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933 (2005) (mitigating evidence may include, among other

things, the potential that a defendant may be rehabilitated); State v. McNeil, 155 Idaho 392, 403
(Ct. App. 2013) (implying that, in some circumstances, a defendant's rehabilitative potential and
post-sentencing conduct may be mitigating factors).
In this case, Mr. Welsh asserts that when the court denied his motion because "[n]o
information has been submitted which warrants changing the sentence," it did so unreasonably.
(R., p.84.) Mr. Welsh asked the court for leniency due to recent health problems with his brother
and mother, along with his potential for rehabilitation, lack of disciplinary problems while
incarcerated, and desire to continue with volunteer efforts through his church. (R., pp.66-70.)5
Mr. Welsh did not ask the court for a dramatic reduction of his sentence or to be placed on
probation; instead, he merely asked that the court reduce just the fixed portion of his sentence to

5

Mr. Welsh also asserted there were substantial errors and m1ssmg information from the
presentence investigation report relating to the retractions of the statements by both his girlfriend
and her daughter, and overcrowding and poor conditions of the prison. (R., pp.67-69.)
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"either 50% or 18 months of the 3 years fixed, or 2 years fixed as per agreed plea agreement."
(R., p.70.) This request would allow Mr. Welsh to be with his brother during his final days, assist
his elderly mother, and participate in the intensive in-patient rehabilitation program which would
include the treatment recommended by the domestic violence evaluator. (See PSI, p.678.)
Accordingly, Mr. Welsh asserts the court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Welsh respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence to
match the plea agreement, or that his case is remanded to the district court for a new sentencing
hearing. Mr. Welsh also respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying of his Rule 35 motion and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day ofJune, 2020.
/ s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of June, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

RJS/eas

